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Insider Trading Laws In Pakistan – A Crit ique| HaidermotaBNR
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INSIDER TRADING LAWS IN
PAKISTAN: A CRITIQUE
1993
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Insider Trading Laws In Pakistan – A Crit ique| HaidermotaBNR
PTCL, 1993 Jour. 42
INSIDER TRADING LAWS IN PAKISTAN
A CRITIQUE Prepared by:
Khozem A. Haidermota
Insider Trading Laws In Pakistan: A Critique
I. Introduction:-
Average investors act invariably on incomplete or inaccurate information, consequently there
are winners and losers; but for the development of and confidence in capital markets, it is
imperative that such losers do not perceive to have been defrauded. It is a well-established
principle in developed capital markets of the world that when “insiders” of a public company trade
in their own company stock with the knowledge of material non-public information, a fraud on
the market has been committed. This is based on the hypothesis that the price is an open and
developed securities market is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business. Misleading statements or material commissions distort the true value
of the securities and, therefore, defraud the market and consequently the shareholders at large.
The contention that insider trading must be curbed has, however, been controverted by
several scholars, through the views of such scholars have not been adopted by most capital market
regulators of developed and developing economics. To analyse the merits of such dissent is not
the purpose of this paper. The object is to examine the existing laws on insider trading and to
suggest amendments and clarification where appropriate.
In any event, very briefly, the two main arguments made by those who view insider trading as
acceptable practice are thus: -- First. It is argued that prohibition on insider trading cannot be
enforced under any reasonable commitment of administrative and judicial resources. This
argument has particular relevance in Pakistan because hard-to-detect evasion devices are
available to insiders, such as the use of factitious names or nominees, benamis etc. This problem
is compounded by our protracted and inefficient legal system. Second, unhampered insider
trading can be viewed as a necessary form of compensation for entrepreneurial activity. As
Professor Henry Manne contends, “insider trading is the means by which the incentives for
entrepreneurial activity in large corporations is effectively preserved: the individuals in the
corporation who are responsible for its successes must be able to appropriate the gains.” Manne,
Insider Trading and Law Professors, 23 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 547 (1970).
II. Overview of Legal Framework:-
The legal framework of insider trading laws in Pakistan are found in Sections, 223 and 224 of
the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (hereinafter, the “Companies, Ordinance”) and Section 17(e)(vi)
of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter, the “Securities Ordinance”).
Sections 220 to 222 of the Companies Ordinance mandates inter alia that specified disclosures
made by insiders with respect to the beneficial ownership of their listed company’s securities. The
adequacy and timing of such disclosures, through intertwined with subject of insider trading laws,
will however be dealt with in a separate paper.
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Insider Trading Laws In Pakistan – A Crit ique| HaidermotaBNR
Section 223 of the Companies Ordinance prohibits short selling by certain insiders. Section 224
of the Companies Ordinance requires that insiders report to the Corporate Law Authority
purchases and sales of their own company’s securities within a period of less than six months. Any
gains by such insiders within six months are made recoverable by the company. Section 17(e)(vi)
of the Securities Ordinance prohibits an insider from buying or selling its own securities when such
insider is in possession of material facts and omits to disclose such facts while buying or selling
securities. Section 23(3) of the Securities Ordinance allows a shareholder to bring an action for
damages against an insider for violation of insider trading laws under the Ordinance. This Section
clarifies that such an action for damages may be brought without having to establish a contractual
relationship between the shareholder and the insider. Finally, Section 24 of the Securities
Ordinance permits criminal sanctions against the offending insider.
Research revealed that there has been no prosecution in Pakistan under any of the foregoing
statutes. Therefore, to analyse the implications of these statutes similar laws as existing in the
United States will be examined. Admittedly the capital markets of Pakistan and the United States
cannot be compared. Nonetheless reference to U.S. laws is appropriate for the following two
reasons: (1) insider trading laws have been on the books in the U.S. since 1933 and their courts
and legislators alike have made several mistakes. We could avoid such mistakes by learning from
their experiences; and (ii) for better or for worse, Pakistani statutes in substantial part are
modelled after the U.S. statutes.
III. Prohibition on Buying or Selling Securities with Insider Information under the Securities and
Exchange Ordinance: -
The statute that directly prohibits trading of securities predicated on inside information is
found in Section 17 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 which is relevant part states:
No person shall, for the purpose of inducing, dissuading, effecting or preventing in any
manner influencing or turning to his advantage, the sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly—
(a) to (d) omitted.
(e) do any act or practice or engage in a course of business, or omit to do any act which
operates or would operate as a fraud, deceit or manipulation upon any person, in
particular—
(i) To (v) omitted.
(vi) being a director or an officer of the issuer of a listed equity security or a
beneficial owner of not less than ten percent of such security who is in
possession of material facts omit to disclose any such facts while buying
or selling such security.
Unfortunately, the above statute has not been interpreted by the Courts in Pakistan. If,
however, the regulators are keen to combat insider trading activities, it is likely that they will rely
on the above statute, since it is the only statute found in either the Securities Ordinance or in the
Companies Ordinance where an insider is prohibited from using material non-public information
while buying or selling listed securities.
There are three fundamental concerns with the above statute. First, definition of
insider is a narrow one and under certain circumstances would not cover persons with important
policy making functions at a listed company. Second, if an insider tips off a friend with non-public
material inside information and the friend trades on such information, is the insider (the tipper)
and/or the friend (tippee) accountable? Third, absent guidelines, it would be very difficult to
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Insider Trading Laws In Pakistan – A Crit ique| HaidermotaBNR
ascertain exactly what constitutes material non-public facts which must be disclosed prior to an
insider trading in the issuer’s securities.
III(a) Definition of insider under Securities and Exchange Ordinance:--
Presently, under the Securities Ordinance, insider trading is forbidden for a director or any officer
of the issuer of a listed equity security or a beneficial owner of not less than ten percent of such
security. The identification of a director is generally self-evident, but that of an officer is more
problematic. The definition of an officer found in Securities Ordinance states that “officer … in
relation to an issuer includes managing agents, manager, secretary, accountant or auditor of the
issue.” This definition is unsatisfactory since it makes no attempt to cover people likely to have
inside information, since a person’s title alone should not determine whether such person is an
insider. The proper focus should be on whether a person is “a corporate employee performing
important executive duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging these duties,
to obtain confidential information about company’s affairs that would aid him if he engaged in
personal market transactions.” U.S. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 288
